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Abstract:  We construct an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of economic 
growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each 
other for extra fiscal transfers and two political parties compete with each other for staying 
in power. The main prediction is that relatively large public sectors in pre-election periods 
distort incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent seeking 
activities. In turn, distorted incentives hurt growth. We test this prediction by using a panel 
data set of a group of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982-1996, as well as a cross-
section of 108 industrial and developing countries over the decade 1990-2000. There is 
evidence that electoral and/or political instability cause relatively large public sectors, 
which in turn increase rent seeking (as measured by the ICRG index), and this is bad for 
economic growth.   
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Anecdotal and case study evidence across countries shows that rent-seeking activities 
increase before elections. For instance, participation in strikes and demonstrations, 
lobbying efforts, etc, indicate that the redistributive struggle escalates in pre-election 
periods. In other words, individual incentives to work relative to rent seek deteriorate 
before elections. At the same time, there is rich econometric evidence of electoral cycles in 
economic policy. For instance, government spending increases before elections as 
incumbent policymakers try to bribe the electorate (see e.g. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 
(1997) and Persson and Tabellini (1999a)).
1 In other words, policies become short sighted 
before elections.  
This paper sets up a general equilibrium model to study, both theoretically and 
econometrically, this real-world scenario. To this end, we develop a dynamic model that 
studies the joint determination of fiscal policy, rent-seeking private incentives and 
economic growth, when the driving force is electoral uncertainty. We then test the 
predictions of the model by using a panel data set of a group of 25 OECD countries over 
the period 1982-1996, as well as a cross section of 108 industrial and developing countries 
over the decade 1990-2000. 
We build upon a standard general equilibrium model of economic growth and 
endogenously chosen fiscal policy. Specifically, we build upon the model introduced by 
Barro (1990). To this well-known model, we add two things. First, private agents, apart 
from making their usual consumption/saving decisions, also decide on how much effort 
they will allocate to productive work relative to rent seeking activities. In doing so, rent 
seekers compete with each other for extra fiscal transfers. Our rent seeking mechanism is as 
in Tullock (1967) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991).
2 Second, there are two political 
parties that can alternate in power so that they choose economic policy by competing with 
each other and knowing that there is only a non-zero probability of remaining in power in 
the coming election. Our electoral mechanism is as in e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), 
Lockwood, Philippopoulos and Snell (1996) and Devereux and Wen (1998).  
                                                 
1 For surveys of the empirical literature, see Drazen (2000, chapter 7) and Mueller (2003, chapter 19).  
2 See also Mauro (2002), Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003) and Park, Philippopoulos and Vassilatos (2003) for 
similar setups in which rent seekers compete with each other for extra fiscal transfers. That is, here the 
common pool is the tax base. For surveys of rent seeking and growth, see Drazen (2000, chapter 11) and 
Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14.4). For a survey of rent seeking in general, see Mueller (2003, 
chapter 15).  
  1The main theoretical result is as follows. As the probability of remaining in power 
decreases (or equivalently electoral uncertainty increases), the incumbent party finds it 
optimal to go for a relatively large size of the public sector, which implies that there are 
also relatively high aggregate fiscal transfers. This signals a larger pie that rational 
atomistic individuals are willing to fight over. Thus, relatively large public sectors in pre-
election periods distort private incentives by pushing individuals away from productive 
work to rent seeking activities. In turn, distorted private incentives hurt the macro-economy 
and economic growth. 
The theoretical model gives a three-equation system in economic growth, rent-
seeking activities and the size of public sector. The system is first estimated for a panel of 
25 OECD countries with three five-year periods for each over 1982-1996. For this group of 
countries, we construct a measure of electoral uncertainty defined as the average of pre-
election dummies over the five-year periods (this is similar to Alesina et al. (1997) and 
most of the empirical literature on political business cycles). An additional test is carried 
out by using a more general measure of political stability similar to the indices used by e.g. 
Perotti (1996), Rodrik (1999) and the literature on socio-political instability. This allows us 
to get a cross-section of 108 countries, both developed and developing, over 1990-2000. 
For both of the samples (i.e. the panel and cross-section), the widely used Knack and 
Keefer (1995) dataset on institutions and incentives (known as ICRG index) provides a 
reasonable proxy for rent-seeking behavior.  
The econometric evidence supports the theoretical link analyzed above. In 
particular, electoral and/or political instability cause relatively large public sectors, which 
in turn exert an adverse effect on individual incentives; then, worse incentives hurt 
economic growth. The economic effects of electoral and political uncertainty are found to 
be important. For instance, in the OECD panel sample, an increase in electoral uncertainty 
caused by an additional extra election in a 5-year period is estimated to increase the size of 
public sector (measured by the government share in GDP) by 2 percentage points. This 
aggravates rent seeking behavior (captured by a reduction in the ICRG index) by 0.6-1.3 
units, which in turn causes a drop in the growth rate by 0.18-0.39 percentage points over a 
5-year period. 
What is the value added of our paper? Our work differs because, as far as we know, 
this is the first theoretical attempt to model the effects of electoral uncertainty on the joint 
determination of fiscal policy, rent seeking behavior and economic growth in a unified 
  2general equilibrium framework.
3 Concerning the empirical literature, we estimate a three-
equation model that identifies the channel through which electoral and political uncertainty 
affects the joint determination of these three key variables (namely, the size of government, 
rent seeking behavior and economic growth). This differs from most of the existing 
econometric studies, which have focused on single-equation reduced-form regressions that 
test the relation either between fiscal policy and elections, or between rent seeking and 
political variables, or between growth and rent seeking, or between growth and government 
size.
4 It is worth pointing out that such single-equation reduced-form regressions have not 
established a significant effect from electoral and political uncertainty to endogenous 
variables like rent seeking and growth.
5 Here, in contrast, by estimating a three-equation 
system that identifies the channel through which electoral and political uncertainty affect 
the economy, we do find evidence of such significant effects on rent seeking and growth - 
the channel is the conduct of fiscal policy.  
Before proceeding, two points need to be made. First, we focus on the adverse 
effects of electoral competition. It is well known, however, that elections can also play a 
positive role (e.g. they can control the moral hazard behavior of policymakers, help voters 
select the most competent policymaker, or help voters to choose the policymaker whose 
ideology is closer to the majority of voters). Here, we do not study these issues. Second, we 
do not claim that larger public sectors are bad per se. What we do claim is that, when 
driven by electoral uncertainty and competition, large public sectors are bad for individual 
incentives and this in turn hurts growth. This indirect effect of government policy is in 
addition to the direct (positive or negative) effect that policy may have on growth. Further 
discussion of these two points is provided in the closing section.    
                                                 
3 In the political business cycle literature, electoral instability hurts growth by inducing incumbents to follow 
shortsighted policies (see e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Lockwood et al. (1996), Devereux and Wen 
(1998), Persson and Tabellini (1999a, 2000) and Economides et al. (2003) for dynamic models). However, 
most of this literature abstracts from the effects of electoral uncertainty on rent seeking. On the other hand, in 
the rent-seeking literature, a larger public sector and higher transfers can worsen private incentives and this is 
bad for growth (see e.g. Mauro (2002), Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003), Park et al. (2003) and the papers cited 
in Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14.4)). However, most of these models abstract from elections and 
their effects on private incentives. 
4 For the effects of electoral competition on the conduct of fiscal policy, see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997). For the 
effects of political variables and the size of government on rent seeking activities, see e.g. Treisman (2000). 
For the effects of rent seeking and corruption on economic growth, see e.g. Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer 
(1995), Rodrik (1999) and Hall and Jones (1999). For the effects of the size of public sector on economic 
growth, see the rich survey in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapter 12). Section 3.2 below will provide 
further details on the empirical literature. 
5 See e.g. Alesina et al. (1997) for the effects (or lack of them) of electoral uncertainty on growth, and 
Treisman (2000) for the effects (or lack of them) of political uncertainty on rent seeking. 
  3The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 
3 presents the econometric part. Section 4 closes the paper. All proofs are in an Appendix. 
 
2.  THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
2.1.  Informal description of the model  
With an eye to empirical estimation, we will keep the theoretical model as simple as 
possible. Our aim is to introduce rent seeking and electoral uncertainty into a growth 
model. To do so, we will combine the electoral competition model of Economides et al. 
(2003) with the rent-seeking model of Mauro (2002) and Park et al. (2003).   
            It is helpful to start by discussing the key features of the model. (i) The underlying 
model is Barro’s (1990) model, where public infrastructure is the engine of long-term 
growth. Public infrastructure is financed by distorting income taxes. (ii) Rational atomistic 
individuals can extract from government income (i.e. collected tax revenues) to increase 
their own personal wealth. This is at the cost of social resources allocated to finance public 
infrastructure. (iii) This rent-seeking behavior, on the part of individuals, is modeled as in 
Tullock (1967). Specifically, individuals compete with each other for a fraction of tax 
revenues, and this rent-seeking competition is given by a non-cooperative (Nash) game 
among individuals. (iv) Rent seeking requires time and effort. Thus, each individual 
chooses optimally (in addition to consumption and saving) the allocation of its time and 
effort between productive work and rent seeking activities. (v) Elections are held every 
time period; this is for simplicity. (vi) The political party, which wins the election, chooses 
economic policy to maximize the inter-temporal welfare of the representative household by 
competing with the other party that can win the next election with a non-zero probability. 
(vii) In each time-period, the sequence of events is as follows: economic policy is chosen 
first, and in turn, private agents make their allocation choices simultaneously. (viii) We 
assume infinite-time horizons, discrete time and certainty (except from probabilistic 
electoral uncertainty). 
We will work with backward induction. Thus, within each period t, we will first 
solve the private agents’ optimization problem for any feasible economic policy; in turn, 
we will endogenize economic policy by forming a Nash game between two alternating 
political parties. We will solve for Markov policy strategies and hence a Markov-perfect 
general equilibrium so that optimal policies are sub-game perfect and time consistent. 
 
  42.2. Firms’  problem 
We assume a single firm (this is for simplicity). This firm maximizes profits, π :  
 
t t t t t t l w k r y − − = π                                                                                                               (1) 
 
where   is output produced at time t;   and   are capital and labor used at t; and   and 
 are the interest rate and wage rate respectively. 
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where   and  0 > A 01 < < α  are parameters,   is government production services at t and  t G
I  is a fixed number of population.
6 For similar production functions, see e.g. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapter 4). 
The firm chooses   and   to maximize (1) subject to (2). In doing so, it acts 
competitively by taking prices, policy variables and aggregate outcomes as given. The 
solution of this simple static problem is written in Appendix A.  
t k t l
 
2.3. Households’  problem 
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where   is private consumption at time   and 
i
t c t 01 < < β  is the discount rate. 
 Each  household  i is endowed with one unit of effort time and then allocates 
 of that unit to productive work and  1 0 ≤ <
i
t θ ( ) 1 1 0 < − ≤
i
t θ  to rent-seeking competition. 
The within-period budget constraint of household i is: 
                                                 
6 To avoid scale effects in equilibrium, we assume that it is the average amount 
I
G
, rather than the total  , 
that provides growth-promoting services to the individual firm. This is not important. 
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where   is the end-of-period assets,  1
i
t a + 1 0 < < t τ  is an income tax rate common to all 
households, and   is aggregate transfers and fiscal favours. Thus,   is the pie available, 
and then rent seekers compete for a fraction of that pie (see below for the determination of 
). This is as in the model introduced by Tullock (1967).
t T t T
t T
7 The initial stock, k , is given.  0
Each household   chooses  i { } 1 0 ,,
ii i
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+ =  to maximize (3) subject to (4). In doing 
so, it acts competitively by taking prices, policy variables and aggregate outcomes, 
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2.4.  Government budget constraint   
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where   is spending on infrastructure services and   is total transfers at t. Without loss 
of generality, we rewrite (5a) as: 
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7 For a similar rent seeking technology like in (4), see e.g. Murphy et al. (1991), Mauro (2002), Grossman and 
Mendoza (2003) and Park et al. (2003). For a survey of rent seeking models, see Mueller (2003, chapter 15).  
  6where   is a parameter that shows the allocation of total tax revenue between public 
investment and transfer payments.
1 0 ≤ < b
8 Inspection of (5a)-(5c) reveals that, given  , the 
path of the income tax rate, {} , fully summarizes fiscal policy.   
1 0 ≤ < b
∞
=0 t t τ
 
2.5. Competitive  decentralized  equilibrium   
Given tax policy  , a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE) is defined to be a 
sequence of allocations 
∞
=0 } { t t τ
1 {,,, ,, ,}
ii i i i
tt t t t t t t klca GT θ 0
∞
+ =  and prices   such that: (i) 
households maximize utility and firms maximize profits by taking prices, policy variables 
and aggregate outcomes as given; (ii) all budget constraints are satisfied; (iii) all markets 
clear.
0 {, } tt t rw
∞
=
9 For simplicity, we focus on a symmetric (Nash) equilibrium in which households are 
alike ex post.
10   
Then, Appendix C shows:  
 
Result 1: In a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (for any feasible tax policy), we have 
for private decisions (quantity variables are per capita except otherwise defined):   
() ( ) ( ) [] () t t t t t t k b A b c α
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and for the two types of aggregate government spending,   and  :  t G t T
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8 When we study policy determination below, we will assume that 0 b < ≤  is a parameter. This is for 
algebraic simplicity. This is because the aim of this paper is mainly empirical. Nevertheless, we wish to say 
that there are several ways of endogenizing  . For instance, we could assume that   is determined as the 
outcome of a Rubinstein bargaining solution, where the bargaining is between those that demand more 
resources for productive reasons (e.g. firms) and those that demand more resources for cash transfers (e.g. 
households). Or, in equilibrium,   could increase with aggregate rent seeking activities (see e.g. Park et al. 
(2003)). We have experimented with solutions like this, and we report that the main predictions do not 
change. We therefore prefer to keep b  as exogenously given.   
b b
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10 See e.g. Cooper and John (1988) for symmetric (Nash and cooperative) equilibria and their properties. 
  7Equations (6a), (6b), (6c), (6d) and (6e) give  ,  ,  ct kt+1 t θ ,   and   respectively, 
as functions of the predetermined capital stock,  , and the current value of the policy 
instrument, 
t G t T
t k
t τ , only. This will make the political parties’ optimisation problems recursive 
and hence optimal policies will be time consistent (see below). 
Equations (6a), (6b), (6d) and (6e) are quite standard (see also e.g. McCallum 
(1989), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997), Devereux and Wen (1998) and Economides 
et al. (2003)) except that here we also have effects from incentives,  t θ . Equation (6c) gives 
the solution for  t θ  in a CDE, where recall that  t θ  is the fraction of effort allocated to work 







. That is, the fraction of effort time individuals 
allocate to work relative to rent seeking decreases with the tax rate,  t τ . This happens 
because atomistic agents do not internalize the adverse effect of their rent seeking actions 
on aggregate output and economic growth. Hence, whenever the tax rate,  t τ , increases, 
they get the impression that the contestable prize,  t t t y b T τ ) 1 ( − = , also increases and so 
attempt to extract a greater share of it by devoting less time to work and more time to rent 
seeking. This is as in Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003), Mauro (2002) and Park et al. (2003).  
We can now endogenize policy, as summarized by the income tax rate,  t τ .  
 
2.6.  Electoral system, economic policy and general equilibrium 
We will now follow Economides et al. (2003).
11 We endogenize economic policy by 
forming a non-cooperative (Nash) game between two political parties, denoted by i and  , 
which alternate in power according to an exogenous reelection probability.
j
12 If elections 
take place in each time-period t, we assume that the incumbent party has an exogenous 
probability   of winning the next election and remaining in power at t , and a 
probability   of losing the election and being out of power at  . Thus, the 
transition equation is a two-state Markov process. 
1 0 ≤ ≤ q +1
) 1 ( q − t +1
                                                 
11 We will therefore skip details when unnecessary. As explained in Economides et al. (2003), this modelling 
goes back to Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Lockwood et al. (1996), Devereux and Wen (1998) and many 
others. Lockwood et al. (1996) use a richer model in which the electoral cycle lasts two time-periods so that 
the elected party can remain in power for two periods. Economides et al. also survey the literature.   
12 Assuming that re-election probabilities depend on the state of the economy would not change our main 
results. 
  8A general equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) The currently elected party i 
chooses  t τ  to maximize the utility of the representative household in (3) subject to the 
CDE in (6a)-(6e), and by taking as given the policy of the other party,  , which may be 
in power at  . That is, the in-power party plays Nash vis-a-vis the out-of-power party. 
The out-of-power party takes no action until it wins an election. (ii) We will solve for 
Markov policy strategies, i.e. 
i j ≠
t +1
t τ  can be function of the current state of the game. (iii) We 
will solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in Markov policy strategies, i.e. parties’ 
policies will be symmetric ex post.
13 (iv) We assume that political parties do not care about 
the economy when out of power. Implicit here is the assumption that they earn extra rents 
when in power.
14 (v) The solution for  t τ , in combination with the CDE, will give a 
(Markov-perfect) general equilibrium.  
  From the parties’ viewpoint, the state at t is the inherited aggregate capital stock 
. Let   and  denote the value functions of party i at time t, when in 
power and when out of power respectively. These value functions should satisfy the 
following pair of Bellman equations (party  ’s problem is symmetric): 
kt ) ( t
P k V
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where  ,   follow (6a) and (6b) respectively (see Economides et al. (2003) for details). 
It is easy to show that the above optimization problem gives:   
ct kt+1
 
Result 2: In a Markov-perfect general equilibrium of a symmetric Nash game between the 
political parties, the income tax rate,  t τ , is constant over time and is a solution to:   
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where 
                                                 
13 Thus, there are no partisan effects.    
14 This is for simplicity. Our results do not change if we assume that parties care less about the economy 
when out of power than when in power. See Economides et al. (2003) for details.  
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which is an equation in the tax rate, τ . Then, the solution for τ , in combination with the 
DCE in (6a)-(6e), gives a general equilibrium. 
  Since equation (8) cannot be solved analytically, we resort to numerical solutions 
by using commonly used parameter values. We set  75 . 0 = α ,  9 . 0 = β ,  ,  5 . 0 = b 5 . 0 = q  
and  . The value of  2 . 3 = A α  (the productivity of private capital vis-à-vis public capital in 
private production) is motivated by the calibrations of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 
59) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). The value of β  (the time discount rate) is close to 
the one used by the RBC literature. A value of   (the share of tax revenues allocated to 
public infrastructure relative to transfer payments) equal to   reflects the neutral 
assumption that social resources are allocated equally between infrastructure and transfers. 
Finally, the value of 
b
0.5
A (aggregate productivity) is chosen so as to give a growing economy 
(although this is unrealistically high, recall that  A works as a scale effect only and its value 
does not affect the key variables,  t τ  and  t θ ). 
  Table 1 below reports the effects of a changing   (reelection probability) on the 
main endogenous variables in general equilibrium.
q
15 Namely, on the income tax rate or 
equivalently the government expenditure-to-output ratio ( t τ ), the incentive to work relative 






+1 γ ), the “effective” discount rate (Ω), 





). Notice that effects are monotonic, which is an 
indication of a unique solution. 
Table 1: General equilibrium effects of the reelection probability, q 
q  τ   θ   γ   Ω  
y
c  
3 . 0   2050 . 0   6602 . 0   0310 . 0   36 . 4   3608 . 0  
4 . 0   2045 . 0   6607 . 0   0311 . 0   42 . 4   3607 . 0  
5 . 0   2040 . 0   6613 . 0   0313 . 0   50 . 4   3606 . 0  
6 . 0   6602 . 0   6622 . 0   0315 . 0   60 . 4   3605 . 0  
7 . 0   2020 . 0   6635 . 0   0318 . 0   78 . 4   3604 . 0  
8 . 0   2010 . 0   6656 . 0   0323 . 0   08 . 5   3601 . 0  
Note:  75 . 0 = α ,  9 . 0 = β ,   and  5 . 0 = b 2 . 3 = A . We use Maple V Release 5.1. 
                                                 
15 We focus on the effects of  . This is the important parameter for what we want to do in this paper.    q
  102.7.  Interpretation of results in Table 1  





. Thus, as electoral uncertainty 
increases (i.e.   falls), the party in power finds it optimal to go for a larger public sector, 
where the latter is captured by the income tax rate (
q
τ ). This is a standard result in the 
political business cycle literature. Regarding the effect of q on θ , we have 
0














. Thus, as electoral uncertainty increases (i.e.   falls), incentives to work 
deteriorate (i.e. 
q
θ  falls). This works through economic policy in general, and the size of 
public sector in particular. Namely, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to larger 
public sectors, which in turn push individuals to rent seeking activities. To put it 
differently, atomistic individuals get the impression that the pie gets larger and hence they 
find it optimal to allocate less effort to productive work and more effort to rent seeking. 
Finally, the other results follow naturally: a higher reelection probability (i.e. a higher  ) 
leads to higher economic growth (
q






The mechanism that drives the above results is as follows. When there is electoral 
uncertainty, and the political parties care less about economic outcomes when out of power 
than when in power, the party in power cares effectively less about the future. This is 
translated into shortsighted policies, in the form of a larger public sector. This is a standard 
result in the political business cycle literature. What is novel is that here these large public 
sectors have in turn a detrimental effect on private incentives by pushing rational 
individuals away from productive work to rent-seeking competition for a share of extra 
transfers. Finally, distorted incentives hurt growth. In other words, in addition to a direct 
standard Laffer curve effect, a larger public sector due to elections has an indirect negative 
effect on growth via private incentives. This is a testable scenario.  
 
3.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
This section will test the above theoretical prediction by using data from two sets of 
countries: an OECD panel data set of 25 countries over the period 1982-1996, and a cross 
section of 108 countries for the decade 1990-2000. 
  113.1.  The econometric model   
We will consider a linear econometric model of the following form:  
 
size of government=S(electoral uncertainty; control variables)                                       (9a) 
rent seeking behavior=R(size of government; control variables)                                      (9b) 
growth rate=G(size of government, rent seeking behavior; control variables)                 (9c) 
 
where equation (9a) is equation (8) for the tax rate or equivalently the government 
expenditure-to-output ratio, equation (9b) follows from (6c) and equation (9c) follows from 
(6b). Notice that the size of public sector in (9a) depends only on electoral uncertainty. This 
recursive structure is due to the fact that the government acts as a Stackelberg leader when 
it chooses policy (size of public sector). Also notice that we have added a number of 
auxiliary variables (called control variables) to take account of effects not included in the 
theoretical model but usually included in such regressions (see below for details).   
Concerning the data, we would like to make the following general points (further 
details will be given later). First, long-term time series observations are not available for 
rent seeking, and thus the analysis can only be confined to the medium-term impact of 
these variables on growth. As a minimum, we will not use shorter than 5-year periods, so 
that economic growth and rent-seeking regressions make sense. Second, rent-seeking 
activities are hard to measure. Hence, any empirical methodology can only utilize proxy 
variables, which can hopefully provide adequate description of this type of activities. A 
third question is how general our measure of the size of government should be, given that - 
in practice - it might be that only some parts of public spending are amenable to pre-
electoral manipulation and/or seen as a contestable prize by rent seekers. We have decided 
to stay close to the theory, which suggests that it is the sum of public expenditure or tax 
revenue that should matter. Thus, we will use a fairly general measure, which is the share 
of government in GDP (see also e.g. Rodrik (1998)). Fourth, an important issue is how to 
approximate electoral uncertainty. Here, we will use two different proxies. We will first 
measure electoral uncertainty by using pre-election dummies, as it has been common 
practice in the political business cycles literature (see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997)). The idea is 
that the more elections are held in a given time interval (the 5-year period), the higher is the 
uncertainty that policy makers are facing in this period. This will be described in some 
detail in subsection 3.2 below. Moreover, since data on elections are hard to obtain for 
many countries (and because democratic elections seem to be a privilege of a relatively 
  12small subset of countries), we will also use, in subsection 3.3, as a proxy for uncertainty 
about remaining in power, an index of political stability (see Drazen (2000, chapters 11.4-
11.6), for a survey of studies that use such socio-political indices to account for political 
stability). This proxy for electoral uncertainty will allow us to estimate the model by using 
a large cross section of countries.  
 
3. 2.  Comparison with the empirical literature  
Equations (9a)-(9c) give a structural model that studies the joint determination of the above 
three endogenous variables (size of government, rent seeking behaviour, and economic 
growth) when the driving force is electoral and political uncertainty. As said above, the 
contribution of our paper is that we identify the channel through which electoral and 
political uncertainty affect the joint determination of the three key variables. This differs 
from most of the relevant econometric literature that has, as far as we know, concentrated 
on reduced-form bivariate relations, either between fiscal policy and electoral competition, 
or between rent seeking activities and the size of government and/or political variables, or 
between growth and rent seeking and/or fiscal policy.  
Concerning the determinants of economic growth, there is a vast empirical literature 
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapter 12) and the papers cited there). Focusing on 
the growth effects of rent extraction, Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) have, 
among many others, provided evidence that entrenched corruption and poor institutions are 
a significant impediment to growth. On the growth effects of government spending, Barro 
(1997) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapter 12) provide evidence that government 
consumption has a negative effect on growth rates, while the effects of more general 
indicators of government spending are usually insignificant (see e.g. Barro (1990)). Alesina 
et al (1997) investigate the effect of electoral competition on economic outcomes; electoral 
uncertainty is not found to have a significant direct impact on growth in reduced-form 
regressions (see also Drazen (2000, chapter 11.6), for a review of the empirical findings of 
the literature on the institutional and political determinants of growth).  
Concerning the determinants of rent seeking, the most extensive study is 
Treisman’s (2000) work on the variables explaining the CPI index of perceptions of 
corruption.
16 In his cross-national study, Treisman finds a negative, albeit not significant, 
                                                 
16The CPI index, developed by Transparency International, focuses on the extent of corruption in 
government. As we discuss below, we prefer to use instead the ICRG index as a measure of rent seeking 
activities, because it has a sufficiently long-time series dimension and is a more general measure of rent 
  13effect of various measures of government intervention and policy on the CPI index.
17 
Treisman also reports that political uncertainty, as measured by the average number of 
leaders the country had per year in the preceding period (see p. 414 on how this period is 
defined), is not significantly causing (perceived) corruption in any of his regressions. 
However, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) have recently documented a link between 
electoral rules and corruption. 
Finally, concerning the determinants of government size, and in particular how this 
size if affected by elections, Alesina et al. (1997, chapter 7) provide evidence that 
government spending increases in pre-electoral periods (Drazen (2000, chapter 7) and 
Mueller (2003, chapter 19) survey the literature). A more general study of the empirical 
determinants of the size of public sector can be found in Persson and Tabellini (2003, 
chapter 3), where estimates of the effects of several intuitive variables on different 
measures of the size of government are presented by using panel and cross-section data sets 
(although political uncertainty is not included as a possible explanatory variable). 
 
3.3  Evidence from a panel of 25 OECD countries   
3.3.1 Description  of  data   
We have collected data on elections for 25 OECD countries,
18 over the years 1982-1996 
(where the choice of the time period is dictated by the availability of the rent-seeking 
index). We thus have a panel of 25 countries and three 5-year periods/observations for each 
country. Note that, in a similar panel for OECD, Alesina et al. (1997) have used quarterly 
data on 18 OECD countries over the period 1960-1993.  
Following most of the political business cycles literature, a pre-election dummy is 
constructed by taking the value of one at the year before the election and zero otherwise. 
Specifically, suppose that there is an election held in a country in month x of a given year. 
Then, the year of the election is assigned the value x/12, and the previous year the value 
(12-x)/12. We then construct a variable, denoted as electoral uncertainty, which is the 
average of this pre-election dummy over the five-year period.
19 A larger value implies 
                                                                                                                                                    
seeking than bureaucratic corruption. It should be noted, however, that the CPI and the ICRG indices are 
highly correlated (see Treisman (2000, p. 411) and Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003, p. 967)). 
17 See Tanzi (2002) and Angelopoulos et al. (2004) for the role of public sector in rent seeking. 
18 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
19As discussed above, Treisman (2000) uses a similar proxy for political uncertainty, by constructing a 
measure of the average number of government leaders per year in the recent period.  
  14more elections in these five years, so that incumbent parties face a larger probability of 
losing power on average. 
  To obtain a measure of rent seeking, we will follow usual practice by using the IRIS 
dataset (version IRIS-3, obtained by countrydata.com). This index contains annual values 
for indicators of the quality of governance, corruption and violation of property rights over 
the period 1982-1997, as constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of 
Maryland, from monthly ICRG data provided by Political Risk Services. This dataset has 
been used in a series of papers (see, among many others, Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro 
(1997), Rodrik (1999), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Hall and Jones (1999) and Persson 
et al. (2003)). Notice that although there are other datasets available that can also provide a 
measure of rent extraction activities (like e.g. the CPI index explained above, or the 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) dataset), the ICRG index is the only panel dataset 
on rent seeking and has a sufficiently long-time series dimension (1982-1997) which makes 
it suitable for our purposes. Therefore, by following Keefer and Knack (2002),
20 we 
construct a rent-seeking variable denoted as ICRG. A higher value of ICRG will indicate 
smaller rent seeking. By taking advantage of its time series dimension, we get three 5-year 
averages of this index. 
The Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)), will 
provide us the GDP per capita in constant prices, which is then used to obtain the five-year 
average of annual growth rates (denoted as growth rate), as well as the government share in 
GDP in constant prices,
21 which is also averaged over the 5-year period to give a measure 




                                                 
20 There are five subjective indices available by the IRIS dataset: “corruption in government”, “rule of law”, 
“risk of repudiation of government contracts”, “risk of expropriation” and “quality of bureaucracy”. We 
follow the literature in obtaining an aggregate measure for the quality of institutions by summing these 5 
different indices, with higher scores indicating better institutions. Note that from these indices, “corruption in 
government”, “rule of law”, and “quality of bureaucracy” range in value from 0 to 6, whereas “risk of 
repudiation of government contracts” and “risk of expropriation” are scaled from 0 to 10 with higher values 
indicating better ratings, i.e. less corruption and less risk. The aggregate measure of the quality of institutions 
is then constructed from these variables at a 50-point scale by converting “corruption in government”, “rule 
of law”, and “quality of bureaucracy” to a 10-point scale and summing them up with the other two indices.   
21 This is public consumption in GDP, as public investment is included in the Penn World Tables 6.1 in the 
investment share of GDP. Note that a large part of government spending on education, health, defense, law 
enforcement and public administration, is recorded in national accounts as public consumption. We choose 
not to use a more general variable, like total government expenditure over GDP, as a measure of the size of 
government because a large part of this is made up by interest payments which are not subject to pre-electoral 
manipulation.  
  153.3.2  Econometric methodology  
Our dataset is a balanced panel of 25 countries and 3 time periods. In order to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, one could include a dummy for each country so as to look for 
within country variations over time. However, as is known, important sources of variation 
are left out by restricting the analysis to the “within” dimension of the data. More 
efficiency can be gained if the across countries variation is instead captured by a random 
effects technique. In this case, since any country-specific effects are appended into the error 
term, one has to control adequately for those country characteristics that can be correlated 
with the right hand-side variables, so that random effects estimators are consistent and 
efficient. This is usually tested by Hausman (1978) tests. 
The set of control variables, being used to account for possible heterogeneity, will 
be standard. In particular, this set will include the log of initial level of GDP in each 
country (the 1981 observation), which is denoted as lgdp and is obtained from the Penn 
World Tables. We will also control for education by using the average years of education 
in each country (denoted as education),
22 the degree of each country’s openness (denoted 
as  openness) by using the Penn World Tables measure,
23 and a degree of democracy 
(denoted as democracy) by using the Gastil Index.
24 We will also use some demographic 
variables in the fiscal policy regression, which have been found to be significant in related 
studies (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3)); specifically, we will use the 
percentage of the population between 15 and 64 (denoted as pop15-64) and the percentage 
of population above 65 (denoted as pop 65)). 
The model in (9a)-(9c) is a recursive system with error components. If the error 
terms across equations are correlated, we need valid instruments for the endogenous 
variables in order to apply 2SLS methods. As such instruments, we will use the exogenous 
variables.
25 Although 2SLS estimation can provide consistent estimates, it is not 
appropriate for inference because the standard errors are estimated under the assumption 
that the error term is i.i.d. When the error term has a random effects structure, the efficient 
                                                 
22 This is obtained from the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset, which is available at 
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html    
23 Openness is the sum of exports plus imports (in constant prices) over GDP (in constant prices). We use the 
average value over the 5-year period.  
24 Democracy is the 5-year average of the Gastil index developed by the Freedom House. This is available at 
www.freedomhouse.org 
25 Identification of the rent-seeking equation is hence achieved by using electoral uncertainty and the 
demographic variables as additional instruments for the size of government; identification of the growth 
equation is achieved by using the electoral uncertainty, the demographic variables  and  democracy  as 
additional instruments for size of government and ICRG.  
  16estimator (within the limited-information framework) can be obtained by using Baltagi’s 
(1981) error-component two stage least squares (EC2SLS) method, which is exploiting the 
known restrictions on the error structure (for a general treatment of systems of equations 
with error components, see Baltagi (2001, chapter 7) and Hsiao (2003, chapter 5)). 
Moreover, more efficiency can be gained by full-information methods, which exploit the 
random effects structure of the error term, such as Baltagi’s EC3SLS. Here, we will use 
GMM-EC3SLS estimators, proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Wyhowski (1992), since 
we also want to allow for different instruments in each equation. Table 1 below will present 
estimates obtained by using these three methods (2SLS, EC2SLS and GMM-EC3SLS).  
 
3.3.3 Results   
Columns (1) in Table 1 present 2SLS estimates of the growth and the ICRG equations (see 
(9c) and (9b) respectively, where all exogenous variables are used as instruments) and OLS 
estimates of the size of government equation (see (9a), where no endogenous variables 
appear on the right-hand side). The estimates are in line with the predictions of the theory. 
However, since the standard errors are not appropriate for inference, it is wise to hold off 
discussions of significance. The usefulness of the 2SLS estimates reported here is that, 
given that they are consistent, they can serve as a basis for comparison with the estimates 
obtained from efficient methods such as EC2SLS and EC3SLS that are reported in columns 
(2) and (3).
26 Indeed, the estimates of the coefficients in the three columns do not differ 
greatly, so we can have some confidence in the specification of our model. 
Efficient estimates are presented in columns (2), where each equation is again 
estimated independently, but the random effects structure of the disturbances is exploited in 
a GLS framework. The size of government equation is estimated by standard random 
effects-GLS (since no endogenous variables appear on the right hand side), while the 
growth and ICRG equations are each estimated by one-way EC2SLS. The “within” and 
“between” transformations of all exogenous variables are effectively used as instruments 
under EC2SLS. 
We can now discuss results. We start with the fiscal policy regression. Electoral 
uncertainty leads to a larger size of government. It is interesting to point out the economic 
significance of the estimated coefficient that is close to 10. This means that if a country had 
                                                 
26 Baltagi (1984) presents Monte Carlo evidence in favor of using EC2SLS and EC3SLS, compared to pooled 
2SLS, but also finds that the latter may produce smaller bias in small samples. This is the reason we present 
2SLS coefficient estimates in Table 1 as well. 
  17one more election during the five year period, this would increase the electoral uncertainty 
variable by 0.2 and thus would lead to an increase of about 2 points of the share of 
government in GDP.
27 Concerning the effects of the control variables, notice that richer 
countries have larger public sectors, in accordance with Wagner’s law, but this effect is not 
significant. The pop 15-64 variable has a negative and significant effect, implying that 
countries with a higher age dependency ratio (i.e. population younger than 15 and older 
than 64) require more government involvement. The specification of the size of 
government equation is supported by a Hausman (1978) specification test that is comparing 
the fixed effects and the random effects estimates. For the equation in column (2), this test 
gives a χ
2 statistic of 4.17, which cannot reject the null of no significant difference between 
the random and the fixed effects specification at the 5% level (the relevant critical χ
2
(2) is 
5.991). We may conclude, therefore, that the country effects can be treated as random for 
the specification in column (2).
28
In the rent seeking regression, all the exogenous variables are used as instruments 
for obtaining the results reported in column (2). In accordance with the theory, larger 
governments are, on average, associated with more rent seeking. The effects of the other 
variables are also as expected. Richer countries have better institutions. Also more open 
economies, more democratic rights, and more education, all improve incentives. A 
Hausman type specification test is also performed for this equation in order to check 
whether the country effects can be treated as random. In this case, we compare the EC2SLS 
estimates, which are consistent and efficient under the null, to the fixed effects 2SLS 
estimates,
29 which are always consistent but inefficient under the null. The value of the 
Hausman test statistic is 2.87, which is below the critical χ
2
(4). 
                                                 
27 Notice that in practice there are usually either one or two elections held during the five year period; in fact, 
the electoral uncertainty variable takes values in the range 0.183 – 0.483, as elections may take place in the 
beginning or near the end of each period.  Also note that the share of government in GDP variable has a mean 
of 12.59% and a standard deviation of 5.66; hence, an increase of 2 percentage units is not trivial.  
28 As a robustness check, we have also included pop65 and openness as regressors in the size of government 
equation (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2003)). Concerning openness, the idea is that more open economies 
are associated with larger public sectors (see e.g. Rodrik (1998)). However, we report that these two variables 
turn out to be insignificant (openness gives an estimated coefficient of -0.009 with an associated t-ratio of -
0.27, and pop65 a coefficient of 0.015 with a t-ratio of 0.04, while the results for the rest of variables remain 
practically unchanged). The specification reported in column (2) of Table 1 is preferred because it is 
supported by the Hausman test, whereas, when the two insignificant controls are added, the value of the test 
statistic is larger than the respective critical value. In addition, if we include openness and pop65 in the fiscal 
policy equation, the estimated covariance matrix of the country specific random effect for the whole system is 
not positive definite. Therefore, omitting these two insignificant variables seems to be the correct 
specification. Finally, if we add the rest of the control variables used elsewhere in the system as independent 
variables in the fiscal policy equation, we get insignificant estimates and a rejection from the Hausman test.  
29 Note that the simple fixed effects estimator (as opposed to 2SLS fixed effects) is not consistent, neither 
under the null nor under the alternative, because it does not take into account the correlation of the size of 
  18Finally, in the growth regression in column (2), we again use all the exogenous 
variables as instruments. A higher rating in the ICRG index is clearly good for growth, 
while the size of government is not found to have a significant impact. Maybe, this happens 
because we have also included years of education in the regressions, or because (as Barro 
(1990) has pointed out) the actual size of government is close to its optimal value in OECD 
countries. There is also evidence of conditional convergence within the OECD, in the sense 
that a higher initial level of GDP implies lower growth. Average years of education have a 
positive sign although the estimated coefficient is not significant.
30 Openness does not have 
a significant effect either. A Hausman test gives a χ
2 statistic of 6.46, which cannot reject 
the null that the country effects can be treated as random for this equation too.  
To obtain fully efficient estimates, we also estimate (9a)-(9c) simultaneously by 
using Baltagi’s (1981) EC3SLS. The Hausman tests presented above support the use of all 
the exogenous variables as instruments for the growth and the ICRG equations; on the 
other hand, our discussion of the specification of the size of government equation (see 
footnote 28) implies that only the right hand-side variables in columns (1) or (2) of this 
regression can be treated as valid instruments. Therefore, we estimate the system by GMM-
EC3SLS, as proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Wyhowski (1992), which allows for 
different instruments in different equations. The results are reported in columns (3) in 
Table 1.
31 The resulting estimates for the coefficient vectors are close to those obtained by 
EC2SLS and there is also a substantial improvement in the accuracy of the estimated 
coefficients. 
The theoretical model predicts a specific channel for the effect of electoral 
uncertainty on economic outcomes. It is worth checking the economic significance of this 
channel. As said above, one more election in a five-year period results in an increase in the 
share of government in GDP by 2 percentage points. In turn, this is estimated to reduce the 
ICRG index by approximately 0.6 according to the error components estimates, or by 1.3 
                                                                                                                                                    
government with the idiosyncratic error component (see Wooldridge (2002), p. 289, for the assumptions of 
Hausman tests).  
30 Barro (1997) finds that only secondary and higher years of education of the male population have a direct 
effect on growth, because, he argues, they are a better proxy for human capital. He suggests that other forms 
of education are important for growth, but not as human capital; for example, female education is associated 
with lower infant mortality ratio. This could be the case here as well. Years of education have a positive 
indirect effect on growth via improving institutions, so that when the ICRG index is already included in the 
model, the effect of education is no longer important. Indeed, running the growth regression without ICRG 
results in a higher estimated coefficient for years of education and a t-ratio of 1.15.    
31 The system has been also estimated by using as instruments for the fiscal policy equation, in addition to 
(the “within” and “between” transformations of) electoral uncertainty, lgdp and pop15-64, the “within” 
transformations of the rest of the exogenous variables of the system. This gives very similar results to those 
reported in columns (3). 
  19units, according to the standard 2SLS estimates. These two increases in rent seeking cause, 
respectively, a fall of the growth rate by approximately 0.18 and 0.39 percentage points, 
using a value of 0.3 for the coefficient of the effect of (less) rent seeking on growth. This 
result is obtained by controlling for the effects of other variables.  
Some robustness tests have already been discussed (see, in particular, footnotes 28, 
30, and 31). As an additional test, we will also include in the growth equation the share of 
investment in GDP (denoted as investment share), averaged over the 5-year periods, which 
is obtained from the Penn World Tables. We do not want to include this variable in the 
main specification of the model, discussed above, because in the theoretical model the rate 
of growth in the economy cannot be distinguished from the rate of the increase in capital, 
on a balanced growth path. Nevertheless, it is useful to test for robustness by including the 
investment share in the growth equation. We do so for two reasons: first, because it is 
commonly used in empirical related studies as an explanatory variable of growth (see, for 
instance, the papers referred to earlier); second, because this can provide some indication of 
whether the effect of rent seeking on growth is only realized via the disincentives it creates 
for private capital accumulation, or, if there is an additional effect, by hindering the 
efficient allocation of factor inputs in general. It is worth noting that Mauro (1995) finds 
that if he controls for investment in his growth regressions, his measure of extraction 
activities (the Business International indices of corruption) loses its explanatory power, 
while Knack and Keefer (1995) find that the ICRG index retains its statistical significance 
even if investment is controlled for.  
Column (1) in Table 2 presents EC2SLS results when the investment share is 
included in the growth equation as an explanatory variable. The investment share is 
significant, while the estimated coefficient of ICRG is smaller and not significant (although 
the t-ratio is high). This specification of the growth equation is again supported by a 
Hausman test, as the test statistic is 6.04, which is below the critical χ
2
(5). Efficient 
estimates are presented in Columns (2), where the results are obtained by estimating the 
system by GMM-EC3SLS, as in Table 1, using the investment share as an instrument only 
for the growth equation. The joint estimation again results in a coefficient for ICRG which 
is smaller when the investment share is included in the growth equation, but now it remains 
clearly significant. One may conclude, therefore, that rent seeking seems to induce a 
misallocation of resources that is more general than just reducing investment.   
 
 
  203.4.  Evidence from a cross-section of 108 countries  
3.4.1. Description  of  data   
To test the predictions of the model for a large cross section of countries, we give up our 
previous measure of electoral uncertainty because democratic elections are not a regularity 
in many countries. Instead, as a proxy for electoral uncertainty, we will use a more general 
measure of political stability. The idea is that high levels of political instability are 
associated with uncertainty about remaining in power. 
The measure of political stability that we use is obtained from the Kaufmann et al. 
(2003) dataset on governance.
32 This dataset contains six indices - or clusters - on the 
quality of governance, which are based on a number of different surveys that assess a 
country’s performance in the relative areas. Kaufmann et al. combine the observed survey 
results by using a statistical, unobserved-components procedure. We will use the second 
cluster, labeled “political stability and absence of violence”, as a measure of political 
uncertainty. This dataset does not have a time series dimension, so we use the 1996 
observation for each country. 
The rest of the variables used are those presented in the previous section, the 
difference is that now we use the average of each variable over the period 1990-2000 (lgdp 
is now the 1989 observation). In addition, three regional dummies are included in each 
equation to control for possible regional effects, as is common in cross-country growth 
regressions. The dummies are East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. We do 
not use the education variable, because this would unnecessarily restrict our sample. Data 
on 108 industrial and developing countries are available for this set of variables.    
 
3.4.2 Results   
As with the previous dataset, allowing for correlation among the error terms of the 
equations implies the need of instrumental variables. Again, all the exogenous variables 
will be used as instruments. The results are presented in Table 3. Columns (1) report 2SLS 
estimations, while columns (2) report 3SLS estimations. Overall, there are important 
efficiency gains by using 3SLS. The results are again supportive of the theoretical 
predictions. 
In the fiscal policy regression, political stability is an important factor in explaining 
the  size of government, in the sense that the less threatened governments are to be 
                                                 
32 This is available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002. 
  21overthrown, the smaller the size they choose. Also, openness is positively significant. Thus, 
Rodrik’s (1998) result holds during the 1990s for a cross section of 108 countries (compare 
this with the previous OECD sample, where openness was insignificant). Also, richer 
countries have smaller public sectors (compare this with the OECD sample, where there 
was a positive - although insignificant - effect). The demographic variables, as well as the 
regional dummies for East Asia and Latin America are not significant in this sample. 
Finally, the Sub-Saharan countries have smaller public sectors.
33
In the rent seeking regression, larger governments are, on average, associated with 
worse incentives (see the coefficient on ICRG). The control variables have expected signs, 
but only the index for democratic freedom and the regional dummies for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America are significant. As expected, Latin American countries are 
associated with a particularly strong negative effect on incentives or institutions. A 
Hausman (1978) over-identification test for this equation (see Wooldridge (2002) for 
obtaining a regression form of the test) gives a statistic of 3.402, which cannot reject the 
null that the instruments are not correlated with the error term (the critical χ
2
(2) value is 
5.991). 
In the growth regression, better institutions (ICRG) lead to higher growth, whereas 
the size of government does not have a significant growth effect. Also, in this sample, more 
open economies are associated with higher growth rates, although this is not significant. 
However, if East Asia is dropped, openness becomes significant. This is not surprising, 
given that East Asian countries have been following open economy policies to promote 
growth. Conditional convergence is strongly supported as well with poorer countries 
growing faster. The 1990s have been a bad decade for Sub-Saharan Africa, but this is not 
true for Latin American countries. To test whether our instruments can be treated as 
exogenous, we perform a Hausman (1978) over-identification test for the growth equation. 
The χ
2 obtained from the test is 2.3328, which is below the critical χ
2
(2). As a robustness 
check, we have also included the investment share in the growth regression (averaged over 
the nineties). The estimated coefficient of the investment share is positive, although 
insignificant, under both 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, while the effects of ICRG and the 
rest of the variables in the growth regression are not practically affected. 
 
                                                 
33 Our results in the size of government regression are comparable to those obtained by Persson and Tabellini 
(2003, chapter 3) for a cross-section analysis in the 1990s. Differences in the degree of significance of some 
estimated parameters are probably due to the fact that Persson and Tabellini use total government 
expenditure, while here we use the share of government in GDP, as a measure of the size of government.   
  224.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
We solved a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the link between fiscal policy, 
incentives and economic growth in the presence of probabilistic electoral uncertainty. The 
predictions of the model were tested by using first a panel of 25 OECD countries for the 
time period 1982-1996 and second a cross-section of 108 industrial and developing 
countries over 1990-2000. The focus was on the effects of electoral uncertainty and party 
competition on the choice of fiscal policy instruments and private incentives and in turn on 
the macro-economy. The main result is that electoral competition pushes governments to 
follow relatively shortsighted policies in the form of a relatively large public sector, which 
in turn distorts private incentives and hurts the economy.   
We close with two remarks of caution (see also the Introduction). First, we focused 
on the adverse effects of electoral uncertainty. However, as we said, political competition 
between selfish political parties can also lead to the implementation of efficient policies 
(this is the Chicago school of thought).
34 Hence, the policy message is obviously not 
against elections. The policy message is that societies should seek ways to secure that 
electoral competition does not lead to myopia and corruption. In this respect, the 
constitutional design of electoral competition (see e.g. Persson et al. (2003)), as well as the 
degrees of information and political freedom, are of great importance. Second, what we 
found is that large public sectors, when caused by electoral uncertainty, are bad for 
incentives and growth. Angelopoulos et al. (2004) divide countries by using an index of 
public sector efficiency, which is similar to that introduced by Afonso, Shuknecht and 
Tanzi (2003), and show that, only in countries with inefficiently large public sectors, a 
larger size is associated with worse incentives and lower growth.   
 
 
                                                 
34 See e.g. the introduction in Persson and Tabellini (1999b). 
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Appendix A: The firm’s problem  
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Appendix B: The household’s problem 
We choose to solve this problem by using dynamic programming. Let   denote the 
value function of household i at time  . This function must satisfy the Bellman equation:   
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Thus, equations (B.2a-c), together with (4), give the first-order conditions.  
 
Appendix C: Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium  
The market-clearing conditions are   and  . Combining (2), (5b), (A.1) 
























                                                                                                         
(C.1) 
where quantity variables are per capita.  
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Next, inspection of the logarithmic objective function (see equation (3)) and the Cobb-
Douglas constraint (see equation (2)) implies that (given that economic policy is Markov) 
the conjecture  ( ) t t t t u k u u k V τ τ 2 1 0 log   ; + + = , where   and   are 
undetermined coefficients, can solve the dynamic programming problem in (B.1). Using 
this conjecture, the optimality conditions in (B.2), together with (A.1), imply:  
1 0   ,u u 2 u
() () t t t t t k b A k α
α
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Also, combining (A.1), (A.2), (C.1), (5b) and (5c), we get: 
() t t t t
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Finally, using (A.1), (A.2), (C.2) and (C.5) into (4) we get: 
() ( ) ( ) [] () t t t t t t k b A b c α
α
α θ τ τ αβ τ
−
− + − − =
1 1
1 1 1                                                                 (C.6) 
This is the CDE given by (6a-e) in the text.   
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  28TABLE 1: The effects of electoral uncertainty on fiscal policy, rent-seeking and growth 












































































































































      












      
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two asterisks at the 5% level 
† 









  29TABLE 2: The effects of electoral uncertainty on fiscal policy, rent-seeking and growth, controlling for investment 
















































lgdp  2.4774 
(1.15) 












openness  0.0811** 
(3.38) 
constant  27.2510 
(1.32) 




education  1.1904** 
(3.01) 







constant  -20.3012 
(-0.92) 
   




       








  30TABLE 3: The effects of political stability on fiscal policy, rent-seeking and growth 
























































































































































Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two asterisks at the 5% level 
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